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Abstract
This paper looks at public and private sector wages interactions since the 1960s in the 
euro area, euro area countries and a number of other OECD countries. The paper reports, 
first, a strong positive annual contemporaneous correlation of public and private sector 
wages over the business cycle; this finding is robust across methods and measures of 
wages and quite general across countries. Second, we show evidence of long-run 
relationships between public and private sector wages in all countries. Finally, causality 
analysis suggests that feedback effects between private and public wages occur in a direct 
manner and, importantly also via prices. While influences from the private sector appear 
on the whole to be stronger, there are direct and indirect feedback effects from public 
wage setting in a number of countries as well. We show how country-specific 
institutional features of labour and product markets contain helpful information to explain 
the heterogeneity across countries of our results on public/private wage leadership.
Keywords: government wages; private sector wages; causality; co-movement. 
JEL Classification: C32; J30; J51; J52; E62; E63; H50. 5
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Non-technical Summary 
This paper empirically analyses the interaction between public and private sector wages for the euro 
area and a number of other OECD countries over the period 1960-2006. It looks at the two related 
issues of co-movement and causal linkages. 
This issue is interesting from an analytical and a policy perspective, notably in the euro area. Wage 
spillovers across sectors of an economy might lead to wage costs growing faster than productivity or 
than other fundamentals in some sectors and may affect international cost competitiveness of 
countries’ tradable sectors. In this regards, the interaction between public sector wages with the wages 
of the rest of the economy deserves a separate treatment for several reasons. First, public wages and 
employment comprise almost one quarter of the total dependent work force and total compensation of 
employees in the OECD. Second, public wages are not necessarily determined by market forces to the 
same extent as wages in the private sector. The wage setting behaviour of the public sector is likely to 
differ from that of the private sector due to a number of factors such as a higher degree of 
unionisation, political objectives, the difficulties of measuring labour productivity in the public sector, 
the different status that civil servants enjoy and that might make public wages less reactive to the 
business cycle, or the separate agenda of public employees (rent-seeking behaviour).  In addition, 
there may be institutional linkages between private and public labour market behaviour. Needless to 
say that the subject is also highly relevant from a monetary policy perspective. 
The theoretical and empirical literature on job market interactions between the public and the private 
sector is surprisingly scarce, and provides limited guidance as to the expected dominant mechanisms 
linking public and private wages, or the expected sign of the correlation between wages in different 
sectors. On the empirical front, the few available papers focus on a particular country (mainly Sweden 
plus a few others) and tend to find evidence supporting the hypothesis that the private sector is the 
(nominal) wage leader, while at the same time they find limited support for the opposite causal 
direction (public sector wages cause private sector wages). 
To obtain the most robust results possible, we apply a number of alternative empirical methodologies, 
and perform the analysis for two data samples and different price deflators. The paper provides, firstly, 
empirical evidence on the correlation of public and private wages over the business cycle. The study 
finds that in the euro area and most of the countries of our sample private wages are positively and 
strongly correlated with public wages over the business cycle mostly contemporaneously. Our findings 
appear quite robust both across countries and periods (1960-2006 and 1980-2006). 
Secondly, the paper finds short- medium and long-run co-movements between public and private 
sector wages. For the short-run correlations, the results of the previous (robust) analysis are confirmed. 
For the co-movements at longer frequencies than the standard business cycle, our results show a strong 
correlation between public and private sector wages. Thirdly, (and unsurprisingly) the paper reports 6
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the existence of a long-run relationship between public and private sector wages in all the countries of 
the analysed sample.  Wages in both sectors share a common driving trend that can be interpreted as a 
combination of long-run trends in prices and aggregate productivity. 
Fourthly, the paper conducts a thorough analysis of causality. We run causality tests for different 
transformations of the nominal and deflated wage variables. a) We look at VARs between detrended 
variables (using eleven detrending methods), and thus focus on the Granger-causal links over the 
business cycle. We find a dominant pattern of private sector wage leadership over the business cycle 
for nominal wages and a number of cases of bi-directional causality. When prices are explicitly taken 
into account, the dominant private sector lead vanishes, suggesting that the price level is an important 
adjustment parameter. Moreover, there is evidence of some leading behaviour from the public to the 
private sector. We also run VARs in levels (logs) of the variables which broadly confirm the findings 
of the first approach. A first look at the role of prices seem to indicate that there are significant 
feedback effects from private wages on the price level which we find for all countries plus the euro 
area aggregate. While this influence can also be found for public wages, the evidence is in many cases 
weaker and depends on the deflator. We show how country-specific institutional features of labour and 
product markets contain helpful information to explain the heterogeneity across countries of our 
results on public/private wage leadership. 
From a policy perspective, we can conclude: public and private wages do not decouple. Private sector 
wages seem to exert mostly a stronger influence on public wages than the other way around. However, 
on the whole and in a number of countries results of correlation and causality analysis also suggest an 
important influence from the public sector on private wages both directly and indirectly via prices. 
This has important policy implications in that private but also public wage setting are important for 
overall wage and competitiveness developments. Moreover, second round effects seem to play an 
important role in wage and prices dynamics.    7
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1. Introduction
This paper empirically analyses the interaction between public and private sector wages for the euro 
area and a number of other OECD countries over the period 1960-2006. It looks at the two related 
issues of co-movement and causal linkages between public and private sector wages. 
This issue is relevant from an analytical and a policy perspective, notably in the euro area. Wage 
spillovers across sectors of an economy might lead to wage costs growing faster than productivity or 
than other fundamentals in some sectors and may affect international cost competitiveness of 
countries’ tradable sectors. In this regards, the interaction between public sector wages with the wages 
of the rest of the economy deserves a separate treatment for several reasons. First, public wages and 
employment comprise almost one quarter of the total dependent work force and total compensation of 
employees in the OECD. Second, public wages are not necessarily determined by market forces to the 
same extent as wages in the private sector. The wage setting behaviour of the public sector is likely to 
differ from that of the private sector due to a number of factors such as a higher degree of 
unionisation, political objectives, 
1 the difficulties of measuring labour productivity in the public 
sector, the different status that civil servants enjoy and that might make public wages less reactive to 
the business cycle, or the separate agenda of public employees (rent-seeking behaviour). 
2
In addition, there may be institutional linkages between private and public labour market behaviour. 
First, there may be direct links via the wage bargaining process. If by design the government is the 
wage “leader”, it is likely that the private sector will follow more the government than market 
processes (at least in the short run) and quantities (private employment) are likely to adjust.  If the 
private sector is the wage “leader” it is more likely that prices (wages) adjust which, in turn, reduces 
incentives for quantity adjustment. Second, there may be more indirect institutional linkages. If social 
1 Government employment and wage decisions may indeed depart from the standard profit maximisation behaviour expected 
in the private sector. As discussed by Gregory and Borland (1999) or Forni and Giordano (2003), there are two main 
theoretical approaches in the literature to understanding how public employer’s decisions are taken. One approach treats 
public sector decision-makers as making choices to achieve socially optimal outcomes; the alternative approach introduces 
some personal objective of the politicians. Public sector decision-makers that seek to maximise social welfare may have both 
efficiency goals (minimise the cost of production of output in the public sector, or resolve labor market imperfections) but 
also equity goals (for example use public employment as a redistribution tool, as signalled by Alesina, Danninger and 
Rostagno, 2001, and Alesina, Baquir and Easterly, 2000). 
2 For example, to explain increasing public employment in developing countries Gelb et al. (1991) state that in line with 
theories of rent seeking behaviour, public sector surplus is viewed as the consequence of lobbying for higher wages and 
employment. As regards developing countries, the data seem to confirm the predictions of rent-seeking theories: there appear 
to be little correlation between public and private sector wages (Agénor, 1995). An alternative hypothesis is provided by 
Rodrick (2000): relatively safe government jobs represent partial insurance against undiversifiable external risks faced by 
some developing economies. On different grounds, Matschke (2003) shows empirical evidence of public employees’ pressure 
in Germany ahead of political elections. 8
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benefits and minimum wage levels are tied to wage developments in the public sector, then these 
indirectly influence private wage setting, even if wage bargaining is “officially” independent. Finally, 
not only the direct interaction between public and private wages has repercussions on inflation but 
there is also evidence of indirect feedback effects via prices. For example, public wage shocks may 
raise the inflation rate which in turn could lead to increases in private (and further increases in public) 
wages. From this perspective the subject might turn out to be also highly relevant from a monetary 
policy perspective. 
Our study analyses the interaction between public and private wages in many industrialised countries: 
the euro area aggregate, ten euro area countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands Austria, 
Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Finland), Sweden, Denmark, Norway, United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada and Japan. Using annual data (for the period 1960-2006) is imposed by the absence 
of quarterly data for the variables in this study for most of the European countries in the sample. We 
also look at the results for the sample 1980-2006, given an apparent change in trend around 1980 in 
public employment.  
The study aims to obtain the most robust results possible, by examining nominal wages, and also 
nominal wages deflated with two alternative price deflators (private consumption deflator and GDP 
deflator), by using a large number of detrending techniques, and by applying a host of approaches to 
correlation, co-movement and causality over different time horizons. 
The paper provides, firstly, robust empirical evidence on the correlation of public and private wages 
over the business cycle. We look at the unconditional correlations between detrended series (at the 
standard business cycle frequencies) using eleven methods. The study finds that in the euro area and 
for most of the countries of our sample private wages are positively and strongly correlated with 
public wages over the business cycle in a mostly contemporaneous manner. This is a very robust result 
across countries, in spite of very different institutional settings and different inflation regimes 
witnessed in the different decades covered by our study. 
Secondly, the paper provides an analysis of short-, medium-, and long-run co-movements between 
public and private sector wages using the methodology of den Haan (2000). For the short-run 
correlations the results of the previous (robust) analysis are confirmed. For the co-movements at 
longer frequencies than the standard business cycle frequencies our results show a strong correlation 
between public and private sector wages. Thirdly, following up on these pieces of evidence, the paper 
reports the existence of a long-run relationship (co-integration) between public and private sector 
wages in all the countries of the analysed sample. Wages in both sectors share a common driving 
trend.
Moreover, the paper conducts a thorough analysis of causality. We run Granger-Causality tests for 
different empirical specifications comprising nominal wage variables and the price level. First, we 9
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focus on the Granger-causal links over the business cycle by looking at VARs between detrended 
variables (using eleven detrending methods). Second, we run VARs in levels (logs) of the variables, as 
suggested by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and Dolado and Lütkephol (1996). The analysis suggests 
that feedback effects between private and public wages occur in a direct manner and, importantly also 
via prices. While influences from the private sector appear on the whole to be stronger, there are direct 
and indirect feedback effects from public wage setting in a number of countries. Third, we carry out an 
empirical exercise aiming at understanding the rationale behind the heterogeneity across countries of 
our results on causality, i.e. why in some instances we find private sector wages Granger-causing 
public sector wages and in others the opposite direction of causation. We show how country-specific 
institutional features of labour and product markets contain helpful information to explain the 
heterogeneity across countries of our results on public/private wage leadership. 
The paper is organised as follows. Following a brief literature survey in Section 2, we describe the 
data set and some stylised facts on the developments of public wages for the period 1960-2006 in 
section 3. Section 4 looks at the co-movements of public and private wages over the business cycles, 
while section 5 analyses medium- and long-term co-movements and co-integration. Section 6 looks at 
the causal relationships between the two sectors and the link to labour and product market institutional 
features. Section 7 concludes and provides some policy implications and avenues for further research.  
2. The literature 
The literature has so far paid very limited attention to the correlation between public and private 
wages. In theoretical models (real) public wages are assumed to be exogenous or to follow the same 
determination patterns as private wages (Quadrini and Trigari, 2007, Ardagna, 2007, Holmund, 1997, 
or Calmfors and Horn, 1986). On related grounds Demekas and Kontolemis (2000) develop a static 
model in which increases in government wages lead through the worker flow channel to increases in 
private sector wages. The existing empirical work focuses on quantity links (employment) rather than 
price links (wages) between the public and the private sector.
 34  An exception would be Afonso and 
Gomes (2008) who conduct a pooled analysis of public and private sector wage growth in OECD and 
European Union countries. The authors find that nominal and deflated compensation per public sector 
employee display a statistically significant positive contemporaneous correlation with private sector 
wages.
3 Alesina et al. (2002) find a sizeable negative effect of public spending and in particular of its wage component (wage bill) 
on private sector profits and on business investment. Ardagna (2007) claims that the latter results are consistent with the 
different theoretical models in which government employment creates wage pressure for the private sector, and thus can be 
used as anecdotal evidence supporting that the direction of causality would go from public sector wages and employment to 
private sector wages and employment. She claims that this supports her theoretical assumption of exogenous public wages 
and employment.
4 See for example Algan, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2002) or Forni and Giordano (2003), and the literature quoted therein. 10
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The main theoretical reference as regards expected causality is the so-called Scandinavian model of 
inflation that assumes that the traded-goods sector is the wage leader, i.e. that wage leadership is 
exerted by the sectors that are more open to competition (see for example Strom, 1997). Bemmels and 
Zaidi (1990) look at Canadian industries and find a confirmation of the Scandinavian model, namely 
the tradable sector leading wage setting. Nevertheless, this model is sometimes at odds with the 
empirical literature. In the case of public/private wages sectoral interactions Friberg (2007) does not 
find evidence of the Scandinavian model for Sweden (along these lines see also Holmlund and 
Ohlsson, 1992, and Tagtstrom, 2000). In response to Friberg, Lindquist and Vilhelmsson (2004) apply 
a vector error correction approach to wage setting in Sweden with annual data for the period 1970-
2002, and find long run wage leadership of the private sector and no Granger causation from the 
public to the private sector in the short run, in line with the results already obtained by Jacobson and 
Ohlsson (1994).  
Apart from the case of Sweden, country studies on public-private sector wages causality are also 
scarce. Demekas and Kontolemis (1999) find weak exogeneity of real government wages for private 
sector behaviour in a VAR analysis for Greece (1971-1993). For Chile, Mizala and Romaguera (1995) 
find evidence of the private sector leading public wages after labour market liberalisation in the early 
1980s. An IMF report for Romania (see Christou, Klemm and Tiffin, 2007) shows a bi-directional 
relationship between private and public wages using monthly data for 1993-2006; it also finds that 
government wages lead those in state-owned enterprises which, in turn, influence private wages. 
3. Data and stylised facts 
3.1 Data sources and definition of variables 
We use a standard OECD dataset that has been used in related studies like Algan, Cahuc and 
Zylberberg (2002), Alesina et al. (2002), Lane (2003), or Lamo, Pérez and Schuknecht (2007), among 
others. In particular we use the OECD Economic Outlook database December 2007 Issue. Missing 
variables for some specific time periods/variables in this issue of the OECD have been completed with 
information coming from the Spring 2007, the Spring 2006, and the Spring 2005 issues. 
Regarding the measures of wages we take compensation of employees and compensation per 
employee both in nominal and real terms. Given that deflators have been pointed out as a source of 
disparity of results in the empirical literature on cyclicality of wages (Abraham and Haltiwanger, 
1995), we use two different indices to deflate nominal wages, namely the private consumption deflator 
and GDP deflator. We compute compensation per employee using compensation of employees and 
employment data. Compensation of private sector employees is defined as total economy 11
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compensation of employees minus compensation of government employees. Compensation per private 
employee is defined as private compensation of employees divided by private sector employees minus 
government employment minus self-employment. 
5
The concept of total compensation of employees in the government sector is a well-defined statistical 
concept and in particular for European countries it is a homogeneous concept as defined by the 
European System of National Accounts (ESA95). A different story applies to government 
employment, needed to compute compensation per employee, especially for European countries. EU 
member states do not report to Eurostat (the EU’s statistical agency) standardized employment figures 
for the general government sector. Thus it is necessary to resort to national sources, and the issue of 
homogeneity across countries is more delicate. The OECD presents the best choice as regards cross-
country availability and homogeneity of data in this respect. For statistical issues regarding the 
definition of government employment see OECD (1997). 
6
3.2 Some stylised facts on public wages 
When looking at developments in wages per employee, it is noteworthy that public and private wages 
in the euro area converged between the 1960s and the late 1980s before diverging again in more recent 
years with public wages at increasingly higher levels than private wages (Figure 1, panel 1). By 
contrast, in the US this ratio has fluctuated relatively little over recent decades. Within the euro area, 
France (with one of the highest public employment ratios) also features a broadly constant ratio, with 
public and private wages at similar levels (Figure 1, panel 2). In other euro area countries private 
wages tend to be lower than public wages per employee. 
7
Private wages grew much more strongly than in the public sector until about 1990 before this pattern 
reversed (Figure 2). The pattern of US wage developments was similar to the euro area in the 1970s 
and in most recent years but not in between. Figure 2 also reflects the different behaviour of public 
5 The euro area aggregate excludes Luxembourg, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta, due to lack of data for these countries.
6 Within the ESA95 framework, a rough proxy allowing for a homogeneous measure of the public sector wage bill consistent 
with a corresponding measure of public employment is to be found by adding the items “Public Administration and defence”, 
“Health and social work” and “Education” (NACE classifications L, M and N). Nevertheless, this proxy is far from being 
appropriate for a our study, to the extent that part of compensation of employees and employment under the items “Health 
and social work” and “Education” do include activities that should be labelled under market/private services. In this respect, 
it could also vary markedly across euro area member states. Another source of concern with this source is the heterogeneous 
availability of data across countries and the limited sample size available. 
7 Private and public wage patterns are a mirror image of employment patterns. High public employment coupled with 
proportionate wages per employee might unveil a higher low skill concentration in the public sector. Domeij and Ljungqvist 
(2006) report that the dramatic decline of the skill premium in Sweden since the 1970s is the result of an expanding public 
sector, with the expansion taking the form of drawing low-skilled workers into local government jobs that service the welfare 
state. 12
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employment between the euro area and the US. Euro area public employment growth was very strong 
in the early observation period and below that of the private sector more recently. US public 
employment growth was broadly in line with that of the private sector over recent decades. Figure 2 
also shows that the public sector in the euro area has displayed a much more stable hiring behaviour 
and job security (in terms of annual employment growth rates) than the private sector. By contrast, 
there is not much difference in the volatility of euro area public and private wages per employee (in 
annual growth rates).  Hence, signs of interaction between the two sectors are more likely to be found 
on the wages side. US public employment growth appears much more volatile than in Europe and 
almost as volatile as that in the private sector. 
4. The co-movement of public and private sector wages over the business cycle 
4.1 Methodology 
In this section we focus on co-movements of detrended measures of public and private wages, as it is 
general practice in the empirical business cycle literature, using a variety of detrending methods. 
Following standard practice we measure the co-movement between two series using the cross 
correlation function (CCF thereafter).  For each pair of variables, the CCF computed using different 
detrending methods yield different information. Deciding that one of them is the preferred one, 
independently of the criteria used to take the decision, will discard useful information contained in the 
CCFs that are not selected. To avoid this, we take an agnostic approach by applying the idea of thick
modelling as proposed by Granger and Jeon (2004). We combine the correlation coefficients following 
David (1949) and use Fisher transformations to normalize their distribution and stabilize their 
variance.
8  The transformed coefficients can then be averaged as usual. Once the average is computed, 
we need to undo the Fisher transformation to get the correlation coefficient that summarizes the 
information contained in the combined correlation coefficients. This transformation greatly reduces 
the skew in the distribution, potentially yielding a more accurate estimate of the population 
correlation. In addition, the result of the transformation is minimally biased in small samples. 
9
As regards detrending methods, we use a variety of filters. The underlying assumption to detrending 
filters is that aggregate seasonally-adjusted economic time series can be decomposed into a trend 
component  Tt, the so-called cyclical component Ct that fluctuates around the trend, and an 
8 The standard approach in the literature is to just take one single detrending method and base the subsequent analysis on the 
detrended time series computed using that detrending method. A significant deviation from this practice is Lamo, Pérez and 
Schuknecht (2007), which serves as a model for this Section of the paper. Camacho, Pérez-Quirós and Sainz (2006) and 
Lamo, Pérez and Schuknecht (2007) also use Fisher transformations to combine correlation coefficients. 
9 Following Ganger and Jeon’s suggestion, we exclude from the combined measure methods yielding extreme results (we 
exclude methods yielding a relative volatility above 10). 13
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unpredictable random component Ht, i.e. a given series yt  can be decomposed as yt = Tt + Ct + Ht. Most 
of the detrending filters take out the trend component from the original time series, so that both the 
cyclical and irregular components Ct +Ht are taken as measure of the cycle. Among these standard 
detrending methods we take the following (see Appendix A for a brief description): (i) first difference 
filter; (ii) deterministic trends; (iii) Hodrick-Prescott filter (with two different band-pass parameters); 
(iv) Band pass filter (with two different band-pass parameters); (iv) Unobserved components models: 
we estimate up to 5 different models that differ in the model of the trend and the cycle, including 
linear trend plus fixed-period cycle, local level model plus fixed-period cycle, local linear trend model 
plus fixed-period cycle, local level model plus estimated-period cycle, local linear trend model plus 
estimated-period cycle. The models allow for cycles of 2 to 6 years to be estimated (not just imposed 
as in the basic case) using the so-called DHR (Dynamic Harmonic Regression) methods as in Young, 
Pedregal and Tych (1999). 
4.2 Results 
Table 1 gives an overview of the results for all the analysed countries.
 10 It shows the co-movement 
results for total compensation per private and public employees, both for the variables in nominal 
terms and in real terms (deflated using the two selected deflators), for the two considered samples 
(1960-2006 and 1980-2006). 
Each row of this table displays the robust CCF between a measure of detrended private wages at time 
t, and a measure of detrended public wages at time t-k. Following the standard discussion in the 
literature, it is said that the two variables commove in the same direction over the cycle if the 
maximum value in absolute terms of the estimated correlation coefficient of the detrended series (call 
it dominant correlation) is positive, that they co-move in opposite directions if it is negative, and that 
they do not co-move if it is close to zero. We take maximum values of the combined correlations in 
the ranges 0.20-0.39 and 0.40-0.49 as evidence of weak and moderate correlation respectively. We 
refer to strong correlation if in absolute terms it is larger or equal to 0.50. The cut-off point 0.20 was 
chosen because it roughly corresponds in our sample to the value required to reject at the 5% level of 
significance the null hypothesis that the population correlation coefficient is zero.
11 Finally, the public 
10Appendix B, Tables B1 to B16 provides detailed results for each country for all detrending methods for the full sample. 
11 The cut-off point for the combined correlation in the case of combining independent correlation coefficient estimates, 
which is not strictly our case, would be slightly above 0.1. Nevertheless, some studies recommend (see Rosenthal, 1991) to 
calculate the probabilities for combined correlations by combining the individual probability values of each correlation 
coefficient, in which case our cut-off point would be close to 0.3. We take 0.2 as a compromise between the two alternatives 
which is in line with the cut-off values normally used in the literature. 14
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sector variable is said to be leading (lagging) the private sector variable if the maximum correlation 
coefficient is reached for negative (positive) values of k. 
For nominal compensation per employee (Table 1) we find a dominant strong contemporaneous 
correlation for most countries of the sample and the euro area aggregate. The only exceptions are 
Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden, in which the dominant correlation is also strong and positive, but 
we find that private sector wage movements lead (precede) wage movements in the public sector. 
Belgium is the only case in which public sector wages lead private sector developments (moderate 
correlation). In most of the cases the results by method (see tables in Appendix B) tend to be in line 
with the dominant correlations according to the combined correlation. Even though there is some 
variation in the specific quantitative values, the qualitative message is quite robust. 
The pattern of dominant contemporaneous correlations is also present when looking at the CCFs 
between variables in real terms. 
12 The size of the correlations is smaller, though. The euro area, 
Germany, France, Greece, Norway and Japan present a strong contemporaneous correlation, and 
Spain, Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the United States present moderate or 
weak dominant correlations. Among big euro area countries Italy is an exception as it only shows a 
weak (lagged) positive correlation; nevertheless, this pattern is reversed when considering the sample 
1980-2006. The difference between the correlations of nominal versus real variables is likely to be 
related to the fact that part of the correlation between nominal wages might be explained by price 
developments over the business cycle. At the same time, this evidence shows that public and private 
sector wages are correlated due to other factors than prices, most likely developments in productivity, 
institutional agreements or labour market linkages. 
The annual (contemporaneous) correlation between public and private sector wages is a robust and 
generalised feature of our data. This is a very homogenous result in spite of very different institutional 
settings in the countries. It is worth noting that within the sample we have countries with highly 
unionised labour forces (like the Nordic countries) and countries with low unionisation like the US or 
Canada. A priori there would be no reason to expect that the observed patterns are the same for 
different countries given the important differences in institutions, organisation of the government 
sector and monetary policy. There would be no reasons either not to expect changes over time, given 
the different inflation regimes witnessed in the 60s, 70s, 80s and 90s. Nevertheless, our findings 
appear quite robust both across countries and periods of time (1960-2006 and 1980-2006).  
Interestingly, according to the relative standard deviations (public/private) shown in the first column 
of each panel, the cyclical components of public sector wages are more volatile than those of private 
sector wages for most countries (Table 1). 
12 For each country, and to obtain the most robust results, we averaged the (Fisher transformed) correlations of the 11 
detrending methods using the two alternative deflators.15
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5. Medium- and long-run co-movements, and co-integration 
5.1 den Haan’s medium- and long-term co-movements 
In this section we analyse the co-movement between public and private sector wages using the 
correlation coefficients of forecast errors from vector autoregressive (VAR) systems at different 
forecast horizons, as proposed in den Haan (2000). This procedure adds two relevant features to the 
methods used in the previous section: (i) it is suited for the discussion of short-term, medium-, and 
long-term correlations; (ii) den Haan's procedure can be used for stationary as well as integrated series, 
so that no prior de-trending of the series is required. 
13
Figure 3 presents the correlations (with significance values) for nominal wages per employee and real 
wages per employee for the 1960-2006 sample for some selected euro area (euro area aggregate, 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain) and non-euro area countries (Sweden, US, UK, Canada, Japan). The 
whole set of results for all countries and both sample periods is presented in Appendix C in tables C1, 
C2 and C3. 
As compared to the detrending methods presented in the previous section, den Haan’s method focuses 
on the correlations between the irregular components, after having removed the trend and the inertia of 
the series, i.e. Tt + Ct. Correlations for h=1 would be directly comparable with the correlations for lag 
k=0 shown in Table 1 if the latter would be between irregular components instead of detrended series. 
When applying den Haan’s method and thus filtering out the dynamics of the series due to the 
systematic autocorrelation (Ct), the co-movement patterns between public and private sector wages at 
horizon 1 are very similar than for the detrended series, with coefficients ranging from 0.4 to 0.8 for 
nominal wages, and from 0.4 to 0.7 for real wages. Figure 3 shows these correlations, which are the 
points vertically aligned at horizon 1. In addition, these charts display the correlation of forecast errors 
at longer horizons, which gives an idea of medium term co-movements, being also positive correlated. 
Correlation coefficients between public and private sector wages tend to become larger when the 
forecast horizon increases, and then stabilise, typically at forecast horizons between 3 to 4 years.  
Two countries are special. In line with the results for correlations between detrended wages, Italy 
shows a statistically insignificant correlation between real wages for the 1960-2006 sample, at all 
forecasting horizons. However, this pattern is reversed when looking at the 1980-2006 sample (see 
Table C1), in which case the results for Italy are in line with other big euro area economies. After 
removing the effect of prices, medium term correlations for Spain also lose significance, pointing to 
13 We run Den Haan's method assuming: (i) unit root in the variables, (ii) no unit root in the variables. For the sake brevity 
only the first set is shown, as the qualitative messages did not change by using (i) or (ii). 16
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the fact that medium-term co-movements might be led by price developments, rather than by other 
factors like productivity. 
5.2 Long-run relationship (co-integration) 
Co-integration reflects the long term relationship or long term co-movement among non-stationary 
variables, therefore this section focuses on long term co-movements rather than co-movements at the 
business cycle frequency, and thus can be seen as further evidence on long-run correlations on top of 
the one already presented in the previous section.  
Wages (nominal and deflated) exhibit a single unit root as confirmed by several test under different 
specifications 
14 and thus we test for the presence of co-integrating relationships within a vector error-
correction model (VEC henceforth). To determine the optimal number of lags we estimate an 
unrestricted vector autoregressive models (VAR) using the data in levels, and then choose the 
appropriate lag length using the Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria. 
15  Then we 
rewrite the VAR(p)  in error-correction form as a VEC(p-1),   
¦
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where t y  is a k vector of non stationary I(1) variables.   1  t J   includes  1  t y   and deterministic variables 
that enter the co-integration relation.   t h  is a vector of deterministic variables (constant and/or trend). 
Testing for co-integration between the non-stationary variables  t y amounts to determining the rank of 
matrix 3. The standard strategy for determining the co-integrating rank is to test the sequence of null 
hypotheses, H0: rank(3) = 0, H0: rank(3) = 1. To test this sequence we use two standard Johansen 
tests: the Maximum eigenvalue and the Trace test (see, for example, Johansen, 1995).  
Table 2 summarises the results of the standard Johansen tests for the most plausible VEC 
specifications. 
16 We find that in most cases public and private sector nominal and real (deflated) 
wages are co-integrated, given that the null hypothesis H0: rank (3) = 0 is rejected in most cases and 
for most of the countries, while it is not the case for H0: rank (3) = 1. Nominal wages in Norway and 
the UK are the only cases in which according to both co-integration tests H0: rank (3) = 0 is not 
14 The existence of a second unit root is rejected in all cases, and we therefore safely assume that all series are I(1). Unit root
test results are available from the authors upon request.  
15 When the outcomes of these criteria differ we take the smaller number of lags (p) that guarantees that the residuals of the 
VAR are normally distributed and do not present significant autocorrelation. 
16 The presence of deterministic components in the model affects the properties of the test for co-integration, therefore we 
tried all the possible different combinations of deterministic components in the data and/or the co-integrating equation. The 
selected specifications are available from the authors upon request. 17
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rejected at the 5% level (though they are borderline cases). In the case of real variables, the only 
exceptions are the euro area aggregate, France, Belgium and Denmark when using the private 
consumption deflator (but not the GDP deflator); in the cases of France and Belgium the tests would 
signal that real wages are stationary. 
6. Who is in the driver seat? 
6.1 Empirical specification 
One of the most common concepts of causality in empirical analyses is the one defined by Granger 
(1969). If a variable x affects a variable z, the former should help improving the predictions of the later 
variable. A standard Granger-causality test can be implemented in a VAR framework. 
In a first exercise we test for Ganger-causality for a stationary and stable process (detrended 
variables). In a second exercise we test Granger-causality between pairs of original variables (i.e. non-
detrended). The restrictions characterising Granger-causality are exactly the same as in the stable case. 
Following Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and Dolado and Lütkephol (1996) we use a Wald test based on 
a lag augmented VAR. These authors show that a standard Wald test can be used to test linear 
constraints in this framework by just adding an extra lag in estimating the parameters of the process. 
This approach is quite appealing because the least-squared estimation may be applied to the levels of 
the VAR(p+1) model. To carry out the causality test it is not necessary to perform a VEC 
reparameterisation of the process to account for cointegration, because the least-squares estimators of 
the relevant matrices do not change due to the reparameterisation. 
The model we are interested in contains public sector wages, private sector wages and expected prices 
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where C is a 3x1 vector of constant coefficients, each  j A is a 3x3 matrix, p the order of the VAR, and 
H  a 3x1 vector of random disturbances. 
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Within this formulation we can accommodate our previous discussion on nominal and real wages. In 
order to make a general discussion of the impact of prices on the relationship between wages in both 
sectors, we look at the results of two comparable sets of estimated equations: 
 (i)  [Nominal wages] Impose in (3) and (4) the constraints  0 1 0        
i
p
i i a a a  , for 
PR PU i ,   .
(ii) [Nominal wages and prices] Equations (3) and (4) without constraints on the coefficients. 
Notice that in the standard practice real wages are defined in such a way that  1 0  
i a . Imposing this 
constraint and rearranging the resulting coefficients to express all wage variables in, say, equation (3), 
as real (deflated) wages (i.e.  t
PU
t p w  ), the following particular case of equation (3) can be obtained: 
    1 C p w t
PU
t    t
PU
t PU p w L A ) (
* 1    t
PR
t PR p w L A ) (
* 1  t p L A ) (
* PU
t H . If, in addition, the 
constraint 0 ) (
*   L A is imposed, thus restricting the VAR to include only real (deflated) public and 
private wages), the previous equation turns out to be      1 C p w t
PU
t    t
PU
t PU p w L A ) (
* 1
   t
PR
t PR p w L A ) (
* 1 PU
t H . This specification is a quite restricted formulation of equation (3), and the 
equivalent equation (4), and thus we preferred to contemplate the two, more general cases (i) and (ii) 
above as a parallel to the exercise carried out in the previous sections with nominal and real (deflated) 
variables.
6.2 Causality analysis 
Table 3 shows the results of the first exercise analysing causality. It summarises the results of running 
Granger-Causality tests with VAR models with nominal compensation per employee in the public and 
private sector (exercise (i) above), and the same vector but including expected prices (exercise (ii) 
above). For each 2-variables or 3-variables specification we detrended the variables using the 11 
detrending methods described in a previous section (first differences being one, and the other ten 
shown under “Other filters”), and then we run the corresponding Granger-causality tests for each 
group. We show an arrow when at least 6 methods out of 11 showed significant evidence of Granger-
causality. 
17
For nominal wages (first two columns of Table 3), the dominant pattern is one in which private sector 
developments over the business cycle cause  public sector developments. This is correct for the euro 
area aggregate and most member countries in the sample: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, 
Greece, Portugal and Finland. Finland, Sweden and Denmark show bi-directional causality, whereby 
past developments in private sector wages do have an influence on public sector today but also past 
                                                
17 Results for 1980-2006 can be found in Appendix D, Table D1. 19
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public sector wages do contain valuable information to predict today’s private wages. In the Anglo-
Saxon group the US, the UK and Canada show causality from the private to the public sector, while in 
Belgium and Japan the causality flows in the opposite direction (from public to private). 
When prices are taken explicitly into account in the VAR (columns 3 onwards in Table 3) some 
leading behaviour from public to private sector wages arises in the case of Ireland, France, Finland and 
Italy (in the latter case weak evidence: 5 out of 11 methods) and Germany and Belgium only when 
applying the private consumption deflator. A remarkable result is that the dominant leading behaviour 
of the private sector wages vanishes for the Anglo-Saxon countries as well as for Italy, Spain, Greece 
and Portugal. In general comparing results for bi-variate nominal wage VARs with those when prices 
are taken into account it seems that prices are likely to play an important role in the transmission of 
private wage leadership.
Table 4 presents the results of the second exercise carried out to analyze causality. It shows Granger-
causality results using VARs in the levels of the variables. In this section causality results do not only 
show linkages over business cycle frequencies, but rather have to be interpreted as a mixture of short- 
and long-run linkages. 
18 As regards nominal wages (columns 1 and 2, Table 4) there is again broad 
evidence in favour of private sector wages leading public sector wages; this is found for all countries 
except Netherlands, Ireland and Norway. There are a number of instances in which nominal wages in 
the public sector do have some explanatory power for future private sector nominal wages: Italy, 
Netherlands, Greece, Portugal and, in line with the results for the VARs with detrended variables, also 
Finland, Sweden and Denmark. 
There are quite a few instances of Granger-causality from private to public wages when the VARs are 
extended to account for expected inflation (columns 3 to 6). In line with the earlier analysis, Ireland, 
France, Finland and the Netherlands (and Italy for GDP deflator only) also show Granger causality 
from public to private wages for both inflation measures. Again,  it is remarkable that  the evidence on 
Granger causality from private to public nominal wages fades away for some countries and the euro 
area once price development are accounted for. Results from both causality exercises in table 3 and 4
therefore suggest that prices are a relevant factor behind the private wage leadership. The results from 
the VARs described above allow us to look at the interaction between public and private sector wages 
and prices, which nevertheless would deserve an even deeper investigation.   
Table 5 complements table 4 by showing the causality links between prices and wages when the VARs 
are extended to account for expected inflation. Prices Granger cause private wages.
19 Prices also affect 
public wages in most countries although the evidence is weaker in a few cases (Austria, Greece, 
                                                
18 Detailed results of running these tests with different specifications and p-values for the relevant null hypothesis are 
presented in Appendix E (Tables E1, E2 and E3).
19 With the only exception of Belgium which is somewhat surprising given institutionalised wage indexation in this country. 
In any case, the results for Belgium have to be taken with care given some observed outliers in the dataset used for this 
country. 20
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Portugal, Finland) where only one of the deflators shows significant results.  When looking at 
causality from wages to prices, private wage increases help explain future price increases. The only 
clear exceptions are the Anglo-Saxon countries.   As regards public wages, in the case of Spain, 
Netherlands and Finland they seem to feed back to prices with both deflators. For the rest of the 
countries in our sample the evidence on public wages causing prices is mixed and depends on the 
deflator. Again there is no feedback in the case of the Anglo-Saxon countries.  
Overall, there are significant indirect influences from private wages on the price level which we find 
for all countries plus the euro area aggregate (Column 3). While this influence can also be found for 
public wages, the evidence is in many cases weaker and depends on the deflator. Price level changes 
are found to affect private and (in somewhat fewer cases) public wages. Second round effects 
therefore could play an important role on wage and prices dynamics in EU countries and the euro area 
(although a deeper analysis to confirm this finding is warranted). 
6.3 Public wage leadership and wage setting institutions 
Contrary to the robust results that we get for the co-movement of public and private sector wages, our 
causality results show a large degree of country heterogeneity. Thus, in this section we try to answer 
the following question: is there any relationship between empirical findings on public wage leadership 
and institutional features of labour and product markets, notably wage setting institutions, across 
countries?
We examine the role of institutional features in raising the probability of public sector wage leadership 
(i.e. granger-causality from public to private wages) with the help of a Probit analysis. In those 
instances where public sector wage leadership was statistically significant, i.e. public sector wages 
caused private sector wages, our dependent variable takes the value of 1 (183 observations), otherwise 
it is set as zero (249 observations).Observations are derived from the findings on wage leadership that 
includes 12 methods (11 detrending methods and VARs in levels) and 2 deflators for the 18 industrial 
countries in our sample (which yields up to 432 observations). Independent variables include a set of 
standard OECD-based variables of labour and product market institutions, a set of variables on wage 
bargaining institutions in Europe, the US and Japan generated from the information collected within 
the European System of Central Banks Wage Dynamics Network (WDN),
 20 and a measure of 
globalisation (see Appendix F for details and sources). The fact that the OECD data base is not 
available for Greece and the WDN-based institutional data is not available for Canada and Norway 
reduces the maximum number of observations from 432 to 360. 
As regards variables available from the OECD-based data set, we formulate some testable hypotheses 
on the expected impact of labour market institutions on public wage leadership: (i) stronger 
                                                
20 Based on a standardised questionnaire answered by national experts from central banks of each one of the 22 countries 
considered, for 2 years (1995 and 2006) (see Du Caju et al., 2008). 21
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bargaining coordination between negotiating parties (being state-sponsored and state-imposed co-
ordination one defining feature) and higher union membership may suggest a strong role for a wage 
negotiation benchmark and this may most easily be in the public sector due to the higher degree of 
unionisation; (ii) the impact of bargaining centralisation is less clear; on the one hand the same 
arguments as for bargaining coordination apply while, on the other hand, centralisation may be 
conducive to internalise more of the external effects of wage setting across all negotiating parties 
(hence, less public wage leadership); (iii) stricter employment protection legislation gives unions a 
stronger bargaining power in the private sector, independent of public sector outcomes and, hence, one 
might expect a weaker influence of public wages. 
The variables on wage setting institutions collected via the WDN suggest the following hypotheses: (i) 
the degree of government involvement in collective bargaining is likely to be positively correlated with 
a public wage leadership role; (ii) a higher degree of price indexation is less likely to be positively 
correlated with public than with private sector wage leadership, as private wages, by comprising about 
80% of countries’ wage bill, are a key driver of inflation. This, in turn, determines the next round of 
wages increases (wage price spiral); (iii) a prevalence of occupational and company-level wage setting
is likely to focus negotiations on the specific (private) occupation or firm situation and, hence, less 
likely to coincide with a strong lead role for the public sector; (iv) more regional wage setting
(coupled with social safety nets and inter-regional redistribution more or less prevalent in all 
industrialised countries) may allow more of a public sector lead role as regions can externalise at least 
part of the costs (with, e.g., higher unemployment “automatically” leading to more transfers).  
As to other control variables, we hypothesise that: (i) stronger exposure to global competition 
constraints (index of globalisation) limits the lead role of the public sector in wage setting; (ii) stronger 
exposure to competition pressures in the domestic product markets also limits the leadership of public 
wages as market constraints are more binding and firms have less scope to accommodate other 
influences (product market regulation index). Or, arguing the other way round, stronger product 
market regulation facilitates public sector leadership.  A measure of the public sector size (public 
employment rate) which is likely to be positively correlated with a higher probability of public wage 
leadership is also included in the regression.  
The findings as reported in Table 6 largely confirm these hypotheses. 
21 Column 1 illustrates the 
positive correlation between public wage leadership on the one hand and co-ordinated wage 
bargaining, government involvement, union membership and product market regulation on the other.  
A high globalisation index, wage indexation and employment protection show a negative sign of the 
respective coefficients. When including additional WDN variables (column 2), the expected negative 
                                                
21 The estimated coefficients shown in this table yield the marginal effect of a change in independent variables on the 
probability of public wage causation. The estimations include method dummies and deflator dummies in columns 1 and 2. 
However, they do not include country dummies, given that these would capture the cross country institutional variation 
which we want to be reflected in the explanatory variables. 22
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correlation between occupational and company-level wage bargaining and public wages causing 
private wages becomes visible. Predominant wage bargaining at the regional level coincides with 
public wage leadership as expected though somewhat less robustly. With the inclusion of these 
variables, bargaining coordination (unsurprisingly) loses significance and so does globalisation as 
there is likely to be multicollinearity. The share of public employment turns to have a significant and 
positive coefficient as expected; also unsurprisingly, government involvement loses significance when 
the share of public employment is introduced in the regressions (column 3). Columns 4 and 5 illustrate 
that the findings are robust across the two deflators of wages (GDP deflator and private consumption 
deflator).
7. Conclusions 
The paper provides, firstly, empirical evidence on the correlation of public and private wages over the 
business cycle. The study finds that in the euro area and most of the countries of our sample private 
wages are positively and strongly correlated with public wages over the business cycle mostly 
contemporaneously. Our findings appear quite robust both across countries and periods (1960-2006 
and 1980-2006). 
Secondly, the paper finds short- medium and long-run co-movements between public and private 
sector wages. For the short-run correlations, the results of the previous (robust) analysis are confirmed. 
For the co-movements at longer frequencies than the standard business cycle, our results show a strong 
correlation between public and private sector wages. Thirdly, (and unsurprisingly) the paper reports 
the existence of a long-run relationship between public and private sector wages in all the countries of 
the analysed sample.  Wages in both sectors share a common driving trend that can be interpreted as a 
combination of long-run trends in prices and aggregate productivity. 
Fourthly, the paper conducts a thorough analysis of causality. We run Granger-causality tests for 
different transformations of the nominal and deflated wage variables. First, we look at VARs between 
detrended variables (using eleven detrending methods), and thus focus on the Granger-causal links 
over the business cycle. We find a dominant pattern of private sector wage leadership over the 
business cycle for nominal wages and a few cases of bi-directional causality. When prices are 
explicitly taken into account, the dominant private sector lead vanishes, suggesting that the price level 
is an important adjustment parameter. Moreover, some leading behaviour from the public to the 
private sector arises. In a second exercise, we run VARs in levels (logs) of the variables which broadly 
confirm the findings of the first approach. A first look at the role of prices seem to indicate that there 
are significant feedback effects from private wages on the price level which we find for all countries 
plus the euro area aggregate. While this influence can also be found for public wages, the evidence is 
in many cases weaker and depends on the deflator. 23
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Finally, we examine labour and product market institutional features in relation to the results found on 
public sector wage leadership. Factors that are conducive to public wage leadership include strong 
bargaining coordination with government involvement in collective bargaining, strong product market 
regulation, a high ratio of union membership in employment, and regional wage bargaining. Factors 
that appear to have a negative relationship with public wage leadership include decentralised 
bargaining at the company or occupational level, strong employment protection legislation, a high 
globalisation index (less robust), and a high coverage of  wage setting by inflation indexation 
mechanisms. 
From a policy perspective, we can conclude: public and private wages do not decouple. Private sector 
wages seem to exert mostly a stronger influence on public wages than the other way round. However, 
on the whole and in a number of countries results of correlation and causality analysis also suggest an 
important influence from the public sector on private wages both directly and indirectly via prices. 
This has important policy implications in that private but also public wage setting are important for 
overall wage and competitiveness developments. Moreover, second round effects seem to play an 
important role in wage and prices dynamics.    
In the light of the obtained results, some follow-up work is warranted to further improve the 
understanding of the subject matter of this paper. First, the concept of Granger-causality captures the 
idea of the predictive power that past values of a given variable do have when forecasting another 
variable. Thus, given the annual frequency used for the data we cannot analyse empirically the intra-
annual causal links, i.e. which sector leads within the current year. This might be a potentially relevant 
issue if indeed there were to be intra-year linkages between wages in the public and the private sector. 
These could operate irrespective of the fact that nominal wage contracts are typically fixed for a year, 
i.e. a 4-quarter period, or even for longer time periods by reflecting staggered sectoral wage 
negotiations or discretionary within-the-year wage increases (bonuses, promotions etc). Second, with 
EMU or perhaps already with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty public and private wage interaction 
may have adjusted in the euro area. Empirical analysis that wants to address these two caveats would 
have to overcome the data shortcoming that has induced us to conduct the analysis with annual data. 
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Table 1. The correlations of detrended public and private wages per employee. Combinations of 
Fisher transformations. Annual data 1960-2006 and 1980-2006. 
-2 -1 0 1 2 -2 -1 0 1 2
Euro area 1960-2007 1.13 0.54* 0.58* 0.71* 0.57* 0.39* 1.09 0.37* 0.60* 0.66* 0.19 -0.13
1980-2007 0.83 0.07 0.69* 0.87* 0.40* -0.14 1.20 -0.11 0.30* 0.64* 0.08 -0.31*
Germany 1960-2007 1.19 -0.11 0.46* 0.78* 0.47* -0.17 1.03 -0.16 0.40* 0.77* 0.43* -0.38*
1980-2007 1.08 -0.23* 0.35* 0.86* 0.66* -0.12 1.26 -0.50* 0.24* 0.86* 0.51* -0.37*
France 1960-2007 1.23 0.34* 0.75* 0.89* 0.71* 0.35* 1.32 0.18 0.51* 0.63* 0.22* 0.20
1980-2007 0.96 0.25* 0.63* 0.88* 0.63* -0.05 1.61 -0.26* -0.13 0.51* -0.13 -0.48*
Italy 1960-2007 1.13 0.21* 0.37* 0.70* 0.70* 0.49* 1.71 -0.01 -0.01 0.22* 0.25* 0.22*
1980-2007 1.29 0.17 0.65* 0.91* 0.57* 0.06 2.52 -0.02 0.19 0.70* 0.35* 0.01
Spain 1960-2007 1.49 0.52* 0.46* 0.33* 0.45* 0.65* 2.08 0.19 0.42* 0.43* -0.10 0.09
1980-2007 1.34 0.46* 0.69* 0.71* 0.53* 0.37* 2.05 0.36* 0.39* 0.26* 0.18 0.28*
Netherlands 1960-2007 0.81 0.38* 0.18 0.60* 0.70* 0.22* 1.05 -0.18 -0.15 0.37* 0.22* -0.23*
1980-2007 1.05 0.22* 0.16 0.36* 0.39* -0.05 1.27 0.02 -0.13 0.23* 0.22* -0.22*
Austria 1960-2007 0.86 0.12 0.47* 0.57* 0.52* 0.30* 0.94 0.14 0.15 0.37* 0.14 -0.10
1980-2007 1.68 0.23* 0.24* 0.55* 0.73* 0.48* 1.63 -0.10 -0.02 0.22* 0.60* 0.29*
Belgium 1960-2007 1.12 0.26* 0.40* 0.23* 0.09 0.05 1.29 -0.14 0.10 0.17 -0.31* -0.31*
1980-2007 1.26 -0.26* -0.21* 0.12 0.30* -0.05 1.63 -0.23* 0.13 0.37* 0.07 -0.13
Greece 1960-2007 1.11 -0.05 0.30* 0.75* 0.62* 0.25* 0.91 -0.03 0.38* 0.69* 0.42* 0.12
1980-2007 1.22 -0.31* 0.43* 0.81* 0.31* -0.12 1.26 -0.09 0.39* 0.82* 0.56* 0.15
Ireland 1960-2007 1.08 0.50* 0.61* 0.80* 0.65* 0.26* 1.60 -0.07 -0.14 0.27* 0.11 -0.27*
1980-2007 0.97 0.37* 0.43* 0.58* 0.43* 0.25* 1.92 0.23* -0.14 0.18 0.41* 0.08
Portugal 1960-2007 1.42 0.10 0.20* 0.45* 0.53* 0.43* 1.52 0.01 0.15 0.35* 0.16 0.11
1980-2007 1.53 0.19 0.38* 0.44* 0.28* -0.02 1.98 0.10 0.34* 0.51* 0.32* -0.03
Finland 1960-2007 1.04 -0.15 0.53* 0.82* 0.63* 0.25* 1.09 -0.20* 0.05 0.49* 0.26* 0.02
1980-2007 1.08 0.15 0.33* 0.67* 0.73* 0.58* 1.51 0.16 0.25* 0.53* 0.49* 0.46*
Sweden 1960-2007 1.15 0.26* 0.42* 0.37* 0.56* 0.64* 0.95 -0.03 0.26* 0.48* 0.23* 0.19
1980-2007 1.10 0.00 0.35* 0.65* 0.70* 0.52* 1.13 -0.03 0.32* 0.49* 0.14 0.31*
Denmark 1960-2007 0.84 0.17 0.43* 0.57* 0.68* 0.37* 1.42 -0.40* -0.02 -0.20 -0.19 -0.11
1980-2007 1.08 0.17 0.59* 0.79* 0.46* -0.21* 1.39 -0.51* -0.24* 0.37* 0.17 -0.13
Norway 1960-2007 1.08 -0.21* 0.56* 0.90* 0.50* -0.16 1.03 -0.08 0.37* 0.85* 0.23* -0.24*
1980-2007 0.99 0.20 0.69* 0.81* 0.41* -0.01 1.00 0.06 0.31* 0.80* 0.20 -0.15
United States 1960-2007 1.04 -0.32* 0.29* 0.73* 0.49* 0.14 1.11 -0.04 0.35* 0.47* 0.07 -0.16
1980-2007 1.35 -0.18 0.20* 0.69* 0.44* -0.11 1.06 -0.36* 0.18 0.43* 0.11 -0.12
United Kingdom 1960-2007 1.15 -0.10 0.23* 0.79* 0.67* 0.06 1.40 -0.08 -0.23* 0.20 0.48* 0.24*
1980-2007 1.48 0.30* 0.47* 0.68* 0.64* 0.50* 1.25 0.04 -0.20* -0.34* 0.32* 0.57*
Canada 1960-2007 0.94 0.26* 0.59* 0.77* 0.69* 0.40* 1.06 -0.24* -0.08 0.24* 0.33* 0.10
1980-2007 1.06 0.00 0.30* 0.65* 0.49* 0.27* 1.10 -0.31* -0.35* 0.06 0.26* 0.22*
Japan 1960-2007 1.38 -0.08 0.38* 0.88* 0.76* 0.04 1.34 0.39* 0.60* 0.78* 0.74* 0.56*





(private consumption and GDP deflators)
Correlation of private sector (t) and public sector (t+k) variable
k (lags)




Nominal compensation per employee
Note: an asterisk indicates significance at the 5% level. 28
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Euro area 0 28.0* 19.0 33.3* 25.3 13.1 19.0 21.0 25.3 20.5* 19.0 32.7* 25.3
1 5.2 12.5 5.2 12.3 7.9 12.5 7.9 12.3 12.1 12.5 12.1 12.3
Germany 0 20.6* 19.0 25.0 25.3 13.9 14.1 16.2* 15.4 18.1* 15.7 23.9* 20.0
1 4.4 12.5 4.4 12.3 2.3 3.8 2.3 3.8 5.9 9.2 5.9 9.4
France 0 15.5 15.7 20.4* 20.0 24.0* 14.1 29.0* 15.4 46.7* 15.7 51.5* 20.0
1 4.9 9.2 4.9 9.4 4.9* 3.8 4.9* 3.8 4.8 9.2 4.8 9.4
Italy 0 24.7* 19.0 29.7* 25.3 27.1* 15.7 29.5* 20.0 21.0* 19.0 32.6* 25.3
1 5.0 12.5 5.0 12.3 2.4 9.2 2.4 9.4 11.6 12.5 11.6 12.3
Spain 0 17.3* 15.7 22.8* 20.0 21.8* 16.9 25.4* 18.2 23.0* 11.4 23.4* 12.5
1 5.5 9.2 5.5 9.4 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.7 0.3 3.8 0.3 3.8
Netherlands 0 19.3* 15.7 21.2* 20.0 20.3* 15.7 27.0* 20.0 12.6 14.1 16.1* 15.4
1 1.9 9.2 1.9 9.4 6.7 9.2 6.7 9.4 3.5 3.8 3.5 3.8
Austria 0 18.9* 15.7 27.3* 20.0 22.7* 15.7 29.3* 20.0 22.2* 15.7 28.1* 20.0
1 8.3 9.2 8.3 9.4 6.6 9.2 6.6 9.4 5.9 9.2 5.9 9.4
Belgium 0 20.8* 14.1 23.6* 15.4 22.8* 19.0 36.6* 25.3 20.9* 14.1 24.2* 15.4
1 2.8 3.8 2.8 3.8 13.8* 12.5 13.8* 12.3 3.3 3.8 3.3 3.8
Greece 0 16.6 19.0 26.9* 25.3 19.5* 15.7 21.9* 20.0 19.3* 15.7 21.1* 20.0
1 10.3 12.5 10.3 12.3 2.4 9.2 2.4 9.4 1.7 9.2 1.7 9.4
Ireland 0 25.2* 19.0 36.3* 25.3 34.0* 15.7 40.7* 20.0 25.8* 15.7 33.4* 20.0
1 11.1 12.5 11.1 12.3 6.7 9.2 6.7 9.4 7.6 9.2 7.6 9.4
Portugal 0 16.6* 15.7 23.4* 20.0 23.3* 15.7 28.2* 20.0 26.2* 15.7 28.5* 20.0
1 6.7 9.2 6.7 9.4 4.9 9.2 4.9 9.4 2.3 9.2 2.3 9.4
Finland 0 23.4* 15.7 28.3* 20.0 19.5* 15.7 22.9* 20.0 21.1* 15.7 24.2* 20.0
1 4.9 9.2 4.9 9.4 3.4 9.2 3.4 9.4 3.1 9.2 3.1 9.4
Sweden 0 23.9* 16.9 24.8* 18.2 12.2* 11.4 14.3* 12.5 30.9* 15.7 35.9* 20.0
1 0.9 3.7 0.9 3.7 2.2 3.8 2.2 3.8 5.0 9.2 5.0 9.4
Denmark 0 25.9* 15.7 29.7* 20.0 19.6* 15.7 19.4* 18.2 32.0* 15.7 41.2* 20.0
1 3.8 9.2 3.8 9.4 7.7 9.2 4.0* 3.7 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.4
Norway 0 12.4 15.7 17.1 20.0 21.9* 19.0 27.8* 25.3 17.0* 15.7 23.7* 20.0
1 4.7 9.2 4.7 9.4 5.8 12.5 5.8 12.3 6.7 9.2 6.7 9.4
United States 0 13.9 15.7 22.1* 20.0 12.9 15.7 20.4* 20.0 19.5* 15.7 28.1* 20.0
1 8.3 9.2 8.3 9.4 7.5 9.2 7.5 9.4 8.6 9.2 8.6 9.4
United Kingdom 0 10.6 15.7 19.2 20.0 26.3* 15.7 33.6* 20.0 23.3* 15.7 27.7* 20.0
1 8.5 9.2 8.5 9.4 7.3 9.2 7.3 9.4 4.4 9.2 4.4 9.4
Canada 0 13.6 15.7 21.7* 20.0 25.8* 19.0 29.7* 25.3 17.5* 15.7 25.3* 20.0
1 8.1 9.2 8.1 9.4 3.9 12.5 3.9 12.3 7.8 9.2 7.8 9.4
Japan 0 21.9* 19.0 30.7* 25.3 17.9 19.0 28.4* 25.3 15.6 19.0 26.4* 25.3
1 8.8 12.5 8.8 12.3 10.5 12.5 10.5 12.3 10.8 12.5 10.8 12.3
Private consumption deflator GDP deflator
Nominal compensation
per employee
Deflated compensation per employee
(deflated = nominal / price level)
Note: an asterisk indicates significance at the 5% level. Osterwald-Lenum critical values for both the Maximum-eigenvalue and Trace test 
statistics.29
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Table 3. Granger Causality tests I: detrended variables. Annual data 1960-2006.  
Euro area - ĸ -- --
First difference  01 00 00
Other filters 26 24 43
Germany - ĸĺ ĸ - ĸ
First difference  01 01 01
Other filters 49 78 58
France - ĸĺ - ĺ -
First difference  01 01 01
Other filters 3 1 06 41 0 4
Italy - ĸ -- --
First difference  01 01 00
Other filters 26 52 50
Spain - ĸ -- --
First difference  01 00 00
Other filters 05 33 13
Netherlands - ĸ - ĸ - ĸ
First difference  00 00 00
Other filters 26 4 1 0 26
Austria -- -- --
First difference  01 00 00
Other filters 24 32 33
Belgium ĺ - ĺ -- -
First difference  00 00 01
Other filters 63 62 52
Greece - ĸ -- --
First difference  01 01 00
Other filters 16 33 22
Ireland -- ĺ - ĺĸ
First difference  01 10 01
Other filters 34 1 0 3 67
Portugal - ĸ -- --
First difference  01 00 01
Other filters 37 33 24
Finland ĺĸ ĺĸ ĺ -
First difference  11 11 10
Other filters 88 97 65
Sweden ĺĸ - ĸ - ĸ
First difference  01 01 01
Other filters 77 48 26
Denmark ĺĸ - ĸ - ĸ
First difference  11 00 00
Other filters 88 3 1 0 36
Norway -- -- --
First difference  01 00 00
Other filters 41 50 31
United States - ĸ -- - ĸ
First difference  01 00 00
Other filters 27 35 36
United Kingdom - ĸ -- --
First difference  01 00 00
Other filters 35 55 33
Canada - ĸ -- ĺĸ
First difference  01 01 11
Other filters 48 43 69
Japan ĺ - ĺ - ĺĸ
First difference  01 01 01






Nominal comp. per employee
(model including price level)
Public ĸ Private  
Public ĺ Private   Public ĺ Private  
Public ĸ Private  
Public ĺ Private  
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Table 4. Granger Causality tests II: VARs in levels. Annual data 1960-2006.  
Euro area - ĸ - ĸ - ĸ
Germany - ĸ -- - ĸ
France - ĸĺ ĸĺ ĸ
Italy ĺĸ - ĸĺ -
Spain - ĸ -- --
Netherlands ĺ - ĺĸ ĺĸ
Austria - ĸ -- --
Belgium - ĸ -- --
Greece ĺĸ - ĸ - ĸ
Ireland -- ĺ - ĺĸ
Portugal ĺĸ - ĸ - ĸ
Finland ĺĸ ĺĸ ĺ -
Sweden ĺĸ - ĸ - ĸ
Denmark ĺĸ ĺĸ - ĸ
Norway -- -- --
United States - ĸ - ĸ - ĸ
United Kingdom - ĸ - ĸ - ĸ
Canada - ĸ - ĸĺ -
Japan - ĸĺ ĸ - ĸ
 Public ĺ 
Private
 Public ĸ 
Private
 Public ĸ 
Private
 Public ĺ 
Private





(model with price level)
Private consump. deflator
Nominal compensation per employee
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Table 5. Granger Causality tests II Con’t (Wages and Prices): VARs in levels. Annual data 1960-2006.  
Euro area ĺĺ ĺĺ ĺĺ - ĺ
Germany ĺĺ - ĺĺ ĺ - ĺ
France ĺĺ - ĺĺ ĺĺ ĺ
Italy ĺĺ - ĺĺ ĺĺ ĺ
Spain ĺĺ ĺĺ ĺĺ ĺĺ
Netherlands ĺĺ ĺ - ĺĺ ĺĺ
Austria - ĺ - ĺĺ ĺ - ĺ
Belgium -- - ĺ -- ĺĺ
Greece - ĺ - ĺĺ -- ĺ
Ireland ĺĺ ĺĺ ĺĺ --
Portugal - ĺĺ -- ĺ - ĺ
Finland ĺĺ ĺĺ - ĺĺ ĺ
Sweden - ĺĺ ĺ - ĺĺ ĺ
Denmark ĺĺ ĺĺ ĺĺ ĺĺ
Norway ĺĺ ĺ - ĺĺ --
United States ĺĺ -- ĺĺ ĺĺ
United Kingdom ĺĺ -- ĺĺ - ĺ
Canada ĺĺ ĺ - ĺĺ --








(model with price level)
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Table 6. Institutional determinants of public wage leadership.  
The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if public wages cause private wages. Method of estimation: Probit. 
Specification Specification Specification Specification Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP deflator Private cons. Def.
OECD labour market indicators
1) Index of bargaining coordination 0.231 -0.083 0.167 -0.255 0.125
[2.73]** [0.66] [1.07] [1.37] [0.71]
2) Index of bargaining centralisation  -0.022
[0.26]
3) Employment protection legislation -0.318 -0.838 -1.24 -0.929 -0.873
[3.16]** [4.97]** [5.25]** [3.61]** [3.77]**
4) Union membership/employment 0.003 0.022 0.011 0.026 0.02
[1.33] [3.60]** [1.59] [2.72]** [2.52]*
Product market regulation index
5) Product market regulation index 0.434 1.119 1.857 1.309 1.112
[1.76] [3.84]** [4.39]** [3.22]** [2.58]**
Other control variables
6) KOF index of globalisation -0.011 -0.002 -0.005 0 -0.006
[2.85]** [0.49] [1.05] [0.05] [0.82]
7) Public employment ratio 5.645
[2.47]*
WDN variables
8) Government involvement in collective bargaining 0.415 0.676 0.103 0.801 0.643
[2.67]** [4.31]** [0.28] [4.03]** [3.38]**
9) High coverage by indexation mechanisms (76-100%) -0.214 -0.626 -0.552 -0.623 -0.695
[1.51] [4.96]** [2.85]** [4.15]** [3.65]**
10) Dominant level of collective bargaining: sectoral 0.374 0.505 0.533 0.112
[1.70] [2.40]* [1.81] [0.35]
11) Dominant level of collective bargaining: occupational -0.442 -0.45 -0.423 -0.473
[3.25]** [3.48]** [2.38]* [2.30]*
12) Dominant level of collective bargaining: national 0.365 0.473 0.475 0.266
[1.43] [1.97]* [1.32] [0.68]
13) Dominant level of collective bargaining: regional 0.341 0.325 0.378 0.335
[2.38]* [2.22]* [1.75] [1.72]
14) Dominant level of collective bargaining: company-level -0.469 -0.521 -0.376 -0.629
[4.69]** [5.25]** [2.84]** [4.57]**
Number of observations (maximum possible 432) 360 360 360 180 180
Notes: Robust z statistics in brackets: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The estimated coefficients shown in this table yield the marginal effect 
of a change in independent variables on the probability of public wage causation. The estimations include method dummies and deflator dummies in 
columns 1 and 2. 33
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Figure 1. The evolution of relative wages per employee in the OECD: ratio of wages per employee in the 
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Figure 2. The growth rate of nominal wages per employee (left panels) and employment (right panels) 
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Figure 3. Correlations of forecast errors from VARs between public and private wages per employee. 
h-step ahead forecast errors, h=1, 2, …, 9. 
VAR specification with unit root imposed. Sample 1960-2006. 
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Non euro area 





























Real compensation per employee 
(private consumption deflator) 
 
Non euro area 
Real compensation per employee 





















Note: These panels plot the correlation coefficients of the h-period ahead forecast errors of the indicated variables. Significance 
levels are based on Monte-Carlo confidence intervals. Markers filled-in with colour denote significance at the 5% level, while 
markers filled-in white denote correlations not significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 36
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Appendix A. Description of the detrending methods used in Section 3 
The following methods are used in Section 3 to estimate detrended variables: 
First difference filter: First order differencing takes the cycle to be the variable in first differences. In 
other words, it assumes that the trend is the lagged variable, or similarly the series is a random walk 
with no drift. Therefore yt can be represented as: yt = yt-1 +Ct +Ht, where the trend is Tt = yt-1 and an 
estimate of the detrended component is obtained as yt -yt-1. 
Deterministic trends:  Tt is taken to be a deterministic process which can be approximated with 
polynomial functions of time such that Tt = f(t), f(t) = a0+a1 t+a2 t²...+ah t
h. h is the order of the 
polynomial. Even though the disturbance may be serially correlated, it can be shown that the unknown 
parameters in f(t) can be estimated efficiently by ordinary least squares. In this paper we take h=2.  
Hodrick-Prescott: The Hodrick and Prescott filter (HP Filter) extracts a stochastic trend that moves 
smoothly over time and is not correlated with the cycle. The HP filter crucially depends on a 
smoothing parameter (O) that penalizes large fluctuations. A large O implies a higher penalty and, 
therefore, a smoother cycle. For annual data the value of Oҏtypically used has been 100, although 
recent studies suggest that lower values leave cycles of more reasonable duration. In particular, it has 
been shown that O values of 6.25 deliver cycles of similar length to the cycles resulting with quarterly 
data when using O of 1600, which is the standard value. We calculate two versions of the HP filter, 
one with O equal 100 and another one with O equal 6.25.
Band pass filter: We use an optimal finite sample approximation for the band pass filter as proposed 
by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003). The band pass filter is a frequency domain based filter. It 
assumes that the trend component has the power at lower frequencies of the spectrum. The choice in 
this procedure is to define the limits of the frequency band, say pl and pu, to isolate the cyclical 
component with a period of oscillation between pl and pu. We make two choices for the cycle length 
between 2 and 8 years, {pl , pu}={2,8}, and between 2 and 6 years, {pl , pu}={2,6}, removing thus all 
the fluctuations that have a periodicity larger than 8(6) or smaller the 2 years. 
Unobserved components models: We consider structural time series models in the vein of the basic 
structural model in Harvey (1989). The trend is specified as Tt = Tt-1 + St + Ht




S are mutually uncorrelated white noise disturbances with zero means and variances VT
 2 and VS
 2 
respectively. This model is known as the local linear trend model. The cyclical component Ct is 
assumed to be a stochastic cycle, a mixture of sine-cosine waves in a given period shocked with 
disturbances. 37
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The estimated models for the empirical exercise are the following. First, we take the basic structural 
model and adjust the smoothness of the trend, looking at three cases: (i) linear trend model (VT
 2=0 and 
VS
 2=0) plus cycle; (ii) local level model (VT
 2=0) plus cycle; and (iii) local linear trend model plus 
cycle. Next, we preserve assumptions (ii) and (iii) for the trend, and adjust the model for the cycle 
allowing for cycles of period 2 to 6 years to be estimated (not just imposed as in the basic case) using 
the so-called DHR (Dynamic Harmonic Regression) methods as in Young, Pedregal and Tych (1999). 
Thus, all in all, 5 different unobserved components models are fitted to the data. 38
ECB
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Euro area 1 10.2 14.1 10.3 15.4 10.6 14.1 10.6 15.4
2 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.8
Germany 1 6.8 11.4 6.9 12.5 9.8 11.4 9.8 12.5
2 0.1 3.8 0.1 3.8 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.8
France 1 7.4 11.4 8.7 12.5 18.0* 15.7 28.4* 20.0
2 1.3 3.8 1.3 3.8 10.4* 9.2 10.4* 9.4
Italy 1 12.5 15.7 19.3 20.0 13.3 19.0 24.4 25.3
2 6.8 9.2 6.8 9.4 11.1 12.5 11.1 12.3
Spain 1 5.9 11.4 6.0 12.5 8.3 14.1 10.5 15.4
2 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.8 2.2 3.8 2.2 3.8
Netherlands 1 10.2 11.4 10.4 12.5 10.8 15.7 16.2 20.0
2 0.1 3.8 0.1 3.8 5.4 9.2 5.4 9.4
Austria 1 13.1 16.9 15.0 18.2 20.7* 15.7 29.6* 20.0
2 1.9 3.7 1.9 3.7 8.9 9.2 8.9 9.4
Belgium 1 11.4 11.4 12.2 12.5 9.9 11.4 10.5 12.5
2 0.8 3.8 0.8 3.8 0.6 3.8 0.6 3.8
Greece 1 9.8 11.4 10.7 12.5 9.9 11.4 10.4 12.5
2 0.9 3.8 0.9 3.8 0.5 3.8 0.5 3.8
Ireland 1 9.0 11.4 9.1 12.5 11.5 15.7 17.4 20.0
2 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.8 5.9 9.2 5.9 9.4
Portugal 1 9.9 11.4 10.2 12.5 8.8 11.4 9.5 12.5
2 0.3 3.8 0.3 3.8 0.8 3.8 0.8 3.8
Finland 1 10.6 11.4 10.6 12.5 14.3* 11.4 14.3* 12.5
2 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.8
Sweden 1 10.9 16.9 11.9 18.2 17.4 19.0 24.2 25.3
2 1.0 3.7 1.0 3.7 6.8 12.5 6.8 12.3
Denmark 1 6.8 11.4 6.8 12.5 6.4 11.4 6.7 12.5
2 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.8 0.3 3.8 0.3 3.8
Norway 1 12.8 15.7 19.8 20.0 10.8 14.1 10.8 15.4
2 7.0 9.2 7.0 9.4 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.8
United States 1 8.0 14.1 12.8 15.4 9.5 15.7 17.4 20.0
2 4.8* 3.8 4.8* 3.8 7.9 9.2 7.9 9.4
United Kingdom 1 8.8 14.1 15.0 15.4 7.4 14.1 11.9 15.4
2 6.2* 3.8 6.2* 3.8 4.5* 3.8 4.5* 3.8
Canada 1 8.7 11.4 8.9 12.5 7.9 11.4 9.9 12.5
2 0.2 3.8 0.2 3.8 2.0 3.8 2.0 3.8
Japan 1 13.7 14.1 14.2 15.4 2.0 11.4 3.0 12.5
2 0.5 3.8 0.5 3.8 0.9 3.8 0.9 3.8
Private consumption deflator GDP deflator
Nominal compensation per employee
(model with price level)
 
Note: an asterisk indicates significance at the 5% level. Osterwald-Lenum critical values for both the Maximum-eigenvalue and Trace test 
statistics. 61
ECB
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Appendix D. 
Table D1. Granger Causality tests I: detrended variables. Annual data 1980-2006. 
Euro area ĺĸ ĺĸ ĺĸ
First difference 00 00 00
Other filters 76 66 66
Germany - ĸ - ĸĺ -
First difference 01 01 00
Other filters 57 46 63
France - ĸĺ ĸ - ĸ
First difference 00 11 10
Other filters 36 68 46
Italy -- -- --
First difference 01 00 00
Other filters 04 42 52
Spain ĺĸ ĺ - ĺ -
First difference 11 10 10
Other filters 87 65 94
Netherlands - ĸ - ĸ --
First difference 00 00 00
Other filters 36 06 04
Austria - ĸ - ĸ - ĸ
First difference 01 01 01
Other filters 29 28 27
Belgium -- -- --
First difference 00 00 00
Other filters 04 53 33
Greece - ĸ - ĸ --
First difference 01 01 00
Other filters 18 27 23
Ireland - ĸĺ - ĺĸ
First difference 01 00 01
Other filters 27 74 85
Portugal -- ĺ -- ĸ
First difference 01 10 00
Other filters 24 65 46
Finland ĺĸ ĺĸ - ĸ
First difference 01 11 00
Other filters 67 99 38
Sweden - ĸ -- --
First difference 01 10 00
Other filters 49 35 24
Denmark - ĸ - ĸ - ĸ
First difference 01 00 01
Other filters 18 17 47
Norway ĺ - ĺ - ĺ -
First difference 10 10 10
Other filters 81 53 80
United States -- -- --
First difference 00 00 00
Other filters 34 24 33
United Kingdom - ĸ - ĸ - ĸ
First difference 01 01 01
Other filters 26 15 48
Canada -- -- ĺ -
First difference 00 00 01
Other filters 42 54 74
Japan ĺ - ĺĸ ĺĸ
First difference 01 01 01
Other filters 91 95 8 1 0
Public ĺ Private  
Public ĸ Private   Public ĸ Private  
Public ĺ Private   Public ĺ Private  






Nominal comp. per employee
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Appendix E.  
Table E1. Granger Causality tests II: VARs in levels. Annual data 1960-2006.  
S I CH Q C A I C S I CH Q C A I C S I CH Q C A I C
Euro area 222 0.983 0.018** 122 0.557 0.025** 122 0.557 0.055*
Germany 222 0.744 0.000*** 111 0.298 0.176 112 0.262 0.003***
France 222 0.231 0.000*** 222 0.079* 0.002*** 222 0.016** 0.035**
Italy 122 0.005*** 0.000*** 222 0.560 0.030** 222 0.086* 0.467
Spain 222 0.821 0.000*** 222 0.970 0.842 222 0.874 0.353
Netherlands 222 0.004*** 0.275 222 0.000*** 0.001*** 222 0.017** 0.006***
Austria 222 0.315 0.004*** 222 0.262 0.392 222 0.105 0.475
Belgium 111 0.287 0.060* 122 0.500 0.292 122 0.653 0.154
Greece 122 0.006*** 0.000*** 222 0.193 0.013** 222 0.258 0.068*
Ireland 222 0.175 0.272 222 0.000*** 0.754 222 0.019** 0.028**
Portugal 122 0.015** 0.000*** 122 0.174 0.002*** 112 0.486 0.001***
Finland 222 0.010** 0.000*** 112 0.014** 0.037** 222 0.086* 0.660
Sweden 111 0.044** 0.000*** 111 0.161 0.000*** 111 0.527 0.014**
Denmark 122 0.017** 0.025** 222 0.003*** 0.076* 222 0.317 0.019**
Norway 122 0.911 0.373 122 0.282 0.616 222 0.548 0.534
United States 222 0.973 0.000*** 222 0.725 0.000*** 222 0.723 0.000***
United Kingdom 122 0.589 0.006*** 122 0.448 0.007*** 112 0.624 0.027**
Canada 122 0.533 0.017** 122 0.188 0.006*** 222 0.006*** 0.203











 Public ĸ 
Private
p-value
order p order p order p
p-value
VAR(p+1) VAR(p+1) VAR(p+1) VAR(p+1)
p-value




Nominal compensation per 
employee
Nominal compensation per employee
(model with price level)








Note: An asterisk denotes significance at the 10% significance level, two asterisks denote significance at the 5% significance 
level, three asterisks denote significance at the 1% significance level. 63
ECB
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Appendix F.  
Table F1. Institutional variables used in the empirical analysis of section 6.3. 
Independent variable  Source 
Index of bargaining coordination and centralisation  Ochel (2000) based on OECD 
Employment  protection  legislation  Allard (2005) based on OECD labour market 
statistics database (lmsd) 
Union membership/ employment  Udnet based on OECD lmsd and Visser (2006) 
Index of globalisation  Dreher (2006) 
Product market regulation index  Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005) 
Government involvement in collective bargaining  DuCaju et al. (2008) 
High coverage of indexation (75-100%)  DuCaju et al. (2008) 
Dominant level of collective bargaining: sectoral, 
occupational national, regional, company-level 
DuCaju et al. (2008) 
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